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ARTICLES
RECOVERY IN LOUISIANA TORT LAW FOR
INTANGIBLE ECONOMIC LOSS: NEGLIGENCE
ACTIONS AND THE TORT OF INTENTIONAL
INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS*
David W. Robertson**
Tort law has no special problem with economic loss as such. When
the plaintiff has sustained a physical injury to his' person or to tangible
property in which he had a proprietary interest, items of economic loss-
e.g., loss of earnings and lost profits-are routinely awarded.
The special problem arises when someone who has not suffered
physical injury to his person or tangible property seeks recovery for
financial losses allegedly produced by defendant's conduct. The courts
have been reluctant to recognize such losses as recoverable in tort; the
intentional tort theories addressing the issue are fairly closely circum-
scribed,2 and the "black-letter" negligence rule simply refused recovery.3
An extensive literature refers to this problem by many names, the best
of which is "intangible economic loss." This article uses that term,
defining it to include all items of pecuniary loss (both out-of-pocket
expenditures and losses of expected benefits) sustained by a plaintiff
who has not suffered a physical injury to his person or tangible property.
Copyright 1986, by Louisiana Law Review.
* This article grew from a presentation on December 6, 1985, to the Louisiana
Judicial College. I am grateful to the College's president, Justice Harry Lemmon, and
to its executive director, Professor Frank Maraist, for prodding me into doing this work.
Thanks are also due Bill Powers and Marshall Shapo, who made helpful comments on
a preliminary draft.
** Hines H. Baker and Thelma Kelley Baker Professor of Law, University of Texas.
I. "The pronouns 'he,' 'his,' and 'him,' as used at various points in this [article],
are not intended to convey the masculine gender alone; this usage is employed in a generic
sense so as to avoid awkward grammatical situations which would likely occur due to
the limitations of the English language." W. Prosser & P. Keeton, The Law of Torts
xvii (5th ed, 1984).
2. See Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A
Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 60, 72-76 (1982).
3. But see infra text and notes 23-25.
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I. INTENTIONAL TORT THEORIES IN GENERAL
The elements of the commonlaw intentional torts-battery, assault,
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and trespass to land-can be satisfied without any showing
of physical injury to the plaintiff's person or tangible property.4 Sim-
ilarly, a plaintiff can recover for defamation without showing any phys-
ical injury to his person or tangible property.' Hence, all of these theories
will often provide a basis for recovering intangible economic losses,
although they do not specifically address that issue.
The Anglo-American intentional tort theories specifically addressing
the intangible economic loss issue include misrepresentation (often called
"fraud" or "deceit' ),6 injurious falsehood, 7 and intentional interference
with contractual relations." I have not found Louisiana decisions dis-
cussing the first two theories, although it is likely that both would be
recognized if pressed.' On the other hand, intentional interference with
contractual relations has been the focus of a great deal of recent at-
tention.
II. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
Although at least one early Louisiana Supreme Court decision
awarded recovery on the basis of intentional interference with
contractual relations,10 the "black-letter" Louisiana rule has
4. See, e.g., Breaux v. South Louisiana Elec. Co-op, 471 So. 2d 967 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1985) (plaintiff had no cause of action for wrongful discharge from his employment,
but stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
5. See, e.g., WHC, Inc. v. Tri-State Road Boring, Inc., 468 So. 2d 764 (La. App.
Ist Cir. 1985) (plaintiff had no cause of action for intentional interference with contract,
but stated a valid claim for slander).
6. See W. Prosser & P. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 107 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter
cited as Prosser); Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 525-51 (hereinafter cited as Restate-
ment).
7. Prosser, § 128; Restatement, §§ 623A-52.
8. Prosser, §§ 129, 130; Restatement, §§ 766-74A.
9. The decision discussed infra, text accompanying notes 104-10, support recovery
for negligent misrepresentation; recognizing a cause of action for intentional or reckless
misrepresentation should be easier. At least one Louisiana decision recognizes an action
for slander of title to immovable property (one of the subcategories of injurious falsehood).
See L-M Co. v. Blanchard, 197 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 199 So.
2d 918 (La. 1967).
10. In Graham v. St. Charles St. R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1656, 18 So. 707 (1985),
plaintiff recovered on proving that defendant actively and systematically discouraged
persons from patronizing plaintiff's grocery. The opinion is not forthright as to the theory
of recovery, but the result is hard to explain on any basis other than recognition of the
intentional interference cause of action.
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refused to recognize this tort." The other forty-nine states do
recognize it. 12
Louisiana courts have often found ways around the prohibition.
The' standard approach has been to find something independently
tortious or wrongful about the method defendant used to interfere
with plaintiff's contract. For example, recovery may be allowed when
defendant interfered with plaintiff's contract by outrageous conduct,"
by disparaging plaintiff's title to immovable property,'4 or by de-
faming the plaintiff." Similarly, the courts have suggested that
"conspiracy" between a successful bidder and the job-letting au-
thority to "rig" a public bid might well be a tort. 6 And one re-
cent supreme court decision invokes the doctrine of abuse of rights
as a potential basis for recovery in an interference with contract
case. '
For at least ten years, members of the supreme court have been
signalling their intention to accept the tort of intentional interference."
The most recent and most important indication occurred in Sanborn v.
Oceanic Contractors.19 The Sanborn petition alleged that, after plaintiff
quit his job with defendant in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), defend.
ant refused to release plaintiff's work visa so that he could go to work
for another company. Reading the petition as seeking recovery for
intentional interference with contract, the lower courts sustained an
exception of no cause of action. In a unanimous decision, the supreme
court reversed and remanded to give plaintiff another chance to plead
a cause of action, holding: (1) On the basis of facts appearing in the
record, plaintiff could have alleged that the UAE Immigration Rules
II. See Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (1902); Moss v. Guarisco, 409
So. 2d 323 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 412 So. 2d 540 (La. 1982); Eximco,
Inc. v. Trane Co., 737 F.2d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1984).
12. See Prosser, supra note 6, § 129.
13. See Breaux, 471 So. Zd at 967; Carson v. Stephens, 129 So. 381 (La. App. 2d
Cir, 1930) (defendant liable for stirring up racial prejudices against plaintiff's contractee).
14. See Martin v. Sterkx, 146 La. 489. 83 So. 776 (1920).
15. See WHC, Inc. v. Tri-State Road Boring, lnc,, 468 So. 2d 764 (La. App. ist
Cir, 1985).
16. See Haughton Elevator Div. v. State, 367 So. 2d 1161, 1169 n.9 (La, 1979);
Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. State, 470 So. 2d 976 (La. App. Ist Cir.), cert. granted,
476 So. 2d 338 (La. 1985); Millette Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 417 So. 2d 6, 10 (La. App.
1st Cir.), cert. granted, 417 So. 2d 363 (La. 1982).
17. Sanborn v. Oceanic Contr., 448 So. 2d 93 (La.1984).
18. See PPG Industries, Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058, 1059 n.1 (La. 1984)
(Justice Lemmon); Moss v. Guarisco, 409 So. 2d 323 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 412 So. 2d 540 (La. 1982) (Justices Dennis, Lemmon, and Watson, dissenting from
writ refusal); Desormeaux v. Central Industries, Inc., 333 So. 2d 431 (La. App. 3d Cir,),
cert. denied, 337 So. 2d 225 (La. 1976) (Justices Summers and Tate. dissenting from writ
refusal).
19. 448 So. Zd 91 (La. 1984).
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imposed a duty on defendant to release the visa. (2) Even if the UAE
Immigration Rules gave defendant the right to withhold the visa, defend-
ant's exercise of that right without any legitimate motive might constitute
an actionable abuse of rights. (3) Plaintiff might be able to allege a
valid cause of action for tortious interference with contractual rights.
Justice Calogero, writing for the court, referred to the recent intimations
of sympathy for the intentional interference theory, and suggested that,
if recognized, it would probably require the plaintiff to plead and prove
(a) intentional and willful interference with the plaintiff's contract, which
was (b) a proximate cause [sic] of the failure of the contract and (c)
motivated by malice or at least by no significant interest of defendant's
own. Justice Lemmon, concurring, believed that the petition as it stood
was sufficient to state a cause of action for intentional interference with
contract.
Sanborn 'comes about as close to recognizing the cause of action as
a court could come without actually granting or affirming a recovery
on that basis. Full recognition of the intentional interference tort, surely
just a short step away, will improve the symmetry and consistency of
Louisiana tort law; it is very difficult to reconcile continued rejection
of this tort with recent decisions expanding negligence liability for in-
tangible economic loss. 20 Clarity will also be furthered. While the bound-
aries of the intentional interference tort have not been easy to draw,2
eliminating the necessity for inquiring into the independent wrongfulness
of defendant's methods will at least remove an entire layer of indirection
and consequent obfuscation from the process.22
III. INTANGIBLE ECONOMIC Loss CAUSED By DEFENDANT'S
NEGLIGENCE: OVERVIEW
Traditionally the Anglo-American courts refused recovery for intan-
gible economic loss produced by negligent conduct. 2 Courts often avoided
the traditional rule by finding a contractual basis for recovery, such as
subrogation or third-party beneficiary status for plaintiff.24 Further, the
rule came to be subject to so many exceptions that it sometimes seemed
to have disappeared beneath them.25 Still, it has remained at least a
20. See infra text and notes 104-10.
21. See Prosser, supra note 6, §§ 129, 130.
22. But see Perlman, supra note 2, arguing that the tort should be restricted to
unlawful means cases. Perlman ignores the Louisiana experience.
23. See, e.g., People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail, 100 N.J. 246, 251, 495
A.2d 107, 109 (1985) ("[A) virtually per se rule barring recovery for economic loss unless
the negligent conduct also caused physical harm has evolved throughout this century.")
24. See Prosser, supra note 6, § 129 at 997-1002.
25. Two major exceptions are negligent misrepresentation (see Restatement, supra note
6, § 552) and public nuisance (id., § 821B, comment (e), § 821C & comment (h)).
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prima facie obstacle to recovery. (In this article the traditional view is
sometimes referred to as "the prohibitory rule.")
The prohibitory rule was bottomed on generalized fears of multi-
tudinous claims and limitless liability. These concerns have been called
"the floodgates argument."2 6 Perhaps the best-known articulation of the
floodgates argument was Justice Cardozo's statement in the Ultramares
case. 7 Refusing to hold a negligent accounting firm liable to persons
who suffered financial harm through reliance on an erroneous certified
balance sheet prepared by defendant, Justice Cardozo stated:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft of forgery beneath the cover of
deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeter-
minate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these
terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may
not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences. 28
Of course, fears of "indeterminate" liability are pervasive in neg-
ligence law. 29 But they take on particular force in economic loss cases,
because such cases ordinarily lack any physical or other "natural" limit
on the operation of causation in fact. The idea was this:
In cases of physical injury to persons or property, the task of
defining liability limits is eased, but not eliminated, by the
operation of the laws of physics. Friction and gravity dictate
that physical objects eventually come to rest. The amount of
physical damage that can be inflicted by a speeding automobile
or a thrown fist has a self-defining limit. Even in chain reaction
cases, intervening forces generally are necessary to restore the
velocity of the harm-creating object. These intervening forces
offer a natural limit to liability.
The laws of physics do not provide the same restraints for
economic loss. Economic relationships are intertwined so inti-
mately that disruption of one may have far-reaching conse-
quences. Furthermore, the chain reaction of economic harm
flows from one person to another without the intervention of
other forces. Courts facing a case of pure economic loss thus
26. See R. Dias & B. Markesinis, Tort Law 20-22 (1984).
27. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
28. Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444 (emphasis supplied).
29. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928);
Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill v. Lundin &
Associates, Inc., 34 La. L. Rev. I (1973).
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confront the potential for liability of enormous scope, with no
easily marked intermediate points and no ready recourse to
traditional liability-limiting devices such as intervening cause."
Probably the suggested contrast between physical and economic harms
has lost much of its force. The distinction may have been plausible
when the worst imaginable "floodgates" problem stemming from phys-
ical harms would have been all of Chicago suing Mrs. O'Leary's cow.3'
But now that we have witnessed tragedies and narrow escapes such as
the incidents at Thiee-Mile Island, Bhopal, and Love Canal; now that
we are participants or spectators at litigation involving Agent Orange,
bendectin, the Dalkon Shield, and asbestos; now that we know the
terrifying nature of substances routinely transported by railroads and
vessels; now that we live with the threat of nuc!ear accident and toxic
waste contamination, it is hard to think of "exposling] accountants to
a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class"3 2 as our most perplexing scope-of-liability problem.
The problem of intangible economic loss has produced an extensive
literature. 4 Fortunately, two recent decisions-careful study of which
seems indispensable for an understanding of the economic loss problem-
review much of the literature and otherwise provide a focal point for
analysis.
A. The Testbank Case
In State Ex Rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank,3 negligence in the op-
eration of defendants' vessel caused a chemical spill requiring the Mis-
sissippi River Gulf Outlet Channel and four hundred square miles of
surrounding wetlands to be closed for almost a month. Many persons
and businesses suffered intangible economic losses. The types of claim-
ants before the trial court (in forty-one consolidated lawsuits) included
commercial fishermen who regularly operated in and around the closed
area; operators of marinas and boat rentals; marine suppliers; tackle
and bait shops; wholesale and retail seafood enterprises; seafood res-
30. Perlman, supra note 2, at 72-72.
31. New York courts handled the problem of catastrophic fire liablility by adopting
the arbitrary "first structure" rule of Ryan v. New York Central R,R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210(1866). See Prosser, supra note 6, § 43 at 282. See also the cases refusing liability against
water companies who fail to meet fire-fighting needs, discussed in Prosser, supra note 6,
§ 93 at 671.
32. See supra text and note 28.
33. For a similar point, see James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused
by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 50 (1972).
34. See, e.g., the sources cited in Prosser, supra note 6, §§ 129, 130; and in the
opinions in the Testbank case, infra note 35.
35. 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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taurants; and operators of trapped or delayed vessels. Invoking the
prohibitory rule, the trial judge granted summary judgment against all
claimants except the commercial fishermen.
The appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was from the
grant of summary judgment; the correctness of the trial judge's ruling
preserving the commercial fishermen's rights was not before the appellate
court. The en banc court of appeals split ten to five.3 6 The majority
agreed with the trial court's denial of recovery to everyone except the
commercial fishermen. The dissenters argued for recovery for many of
the interests before the court. Both sides had ample precedent to draw
on; the majority stressed the decisions supporting the prohibitory rule,
while the dissent stressed the numerous case-law exceptions. The most
useful feature of the opinions is their dialogue on tort policy.
Judge Higginbotham's opinion for the Testbank majority was a
celebration of the perceived wisdom of the prohibitory rule. It first
stressed an administrative argument: Courts need a "bright line rule." 7
"Those who would delete the requirement of physical damage have no
rule or principle to substitute."3 The majority impunged the normal
scope-of-liability approaches-proximate cause, legal cause, or scope of
duty-as mere "ad hoc" devices, lacking workability. 9 For the dissen-
ters, Judge Wisdom respondted:
[T]he utility derived from having a "bright line" boundary does
not outweigh the disutility caused by the limitation on recovery
imposed by the physical damage requirement. [A requirement
of physical damage represents] a wide departure from the usual
tort doctrines of foreseeability and proximate cause. Those doc-
trines, as refined in the law of public nuisance, provide a rule
of recovery that compensates innocent plaintiffs and holds the
defendants liable for much of the harm proximately caused by
their negligence .... 40
The limitation imposed by "particular" damages [derived from
public nuisance law], together with refined notions of proximate
cause and foreseeability [sic], provides a workable scheme of
liability that is in step with the rest of the tort law, compensates




36. Four of the five Louisiana judges dissented; Judge Davis joined the majority.
37. 752 F.2d at 1029.
38. Id. at 1028.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1045-46.
41. Id. at 1046.
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The majority next turned to a jurisprudential or philosophical ar-
gument, contending that determining scope of liability issues by the case-
by-case application of principles of proximate cause or scope of duty
is not respectable judicial activity; unless a court relies on "preexisting
rules," it is engaging in "management," not "adjudication. ' 42 Judge
Wisdom's response turned that argument on its head, observing that
what really looks like mere "management" is automatic adherence to
a bright-line prohibitory rule, whereas deciding individual cases on the
basis of principle, policy, and justice is the highest judicial function. 43
Saying "no" to all plaintiffs is at least as arbitrary as saying "no" to
some and "yes" to others on a more discriminating basis. 4  Finally,
the majority made two economic arguments. The first contended that
no additional incentive for safety is provided by imposing liability in
catastrophic proportions.4 5 Judge Wisdom answered:
Imposition of liability upon the shippers helps ensure that the
potential tortfeasor faces incentives to take the proper care. The
majority's point is well taken that the incentives to avoid ac-
cidents do not increase once potential losses pass a certain
measure of enormity. But in truth we have no idea what this
measure is: Absent hard data, I would rather err on the side
of receiving little additional benefit from imposing additional
quanta of liability than err by adhering to Robins' inequitable
rule and bar victims' recovery on the mistaken belief that a
"marginal incentive curve" was flat, or nearly so. If a loss must
be borne, it is no worse if a "merely" negligent defendant bears
the loss than an innocent plaintiff absorb the damages. 46
The majority's second economic argument observed that first-party in-
surance (loss insurance obtained by properly prudent victims) is a superior
risk-spreading mechanism to third-party (liability) insurance. 47 The dis-
senting opinion replied that we know nothing about the availability of
loss insurance against the kinds of losses suffered by the victims, whereas
we "do know that [liability] insurance against this kind of loss is already
available for shippers. '48
In the end, the plausibility of the Testbank dissent rests upon the
perceived soundness or unsoundness of the result its approach would
have achieved. The dissenters would have permitted recovery (for out
42. Id. at 1028-29.
43. Id. at 1052 n. 38.
44. Id. at 1049.
45. Id. at 1029.
46. Id. at 1052.
47. Id. at 1029.
48. Id. at 1052.
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of pocket expenses and lost profits) on behalf of the commercial fish-
ermen and the trapped and delayed vessels. Recovery for some of the
land-based businesses-drydocks, marinas, bait and tackle shops, seafood
processors, and seafood wholesalers-would have been allowed on a
showing that "their business of supplying a vital commodity or service
to those engaged in the maritime industry has been interrupted by the
collision, the closure, or the embargo." '4 9 Seafood restaurants would be
excluded. They "are not providers of a vital service to the afflicted
area. Their damage is not sufficiently distinguishable from general eco-
nomic dislocation to allow for recovery." 50 Also excluded would be any
business "not sufficiently involved with the afflicted area as a supplier
of vital inputs peculiar to maritime activity."'"
While it is admittedly difficult to state criteria for distinguishing
between "vital" and other inputs,5 2 or between damages specifically
keyed to the defendant's event and "general economic dislocation," the
intuitions that Judge Wisdom suggests would be employed in drawing
those lines, case by case, are not qualitatively different from those
traditionally at work on scope of liability issues in physical injury cases.
Certainly the position of the Testbank dissenters is as principled and
as "adjudicatory" as that of the majority. One must admit that the
line between recovery and nonrecovery may appear as arbitrary under
a rule of proximate cause as a line created by a requirement for physical
damages. In a sense, any line that the courts draw to limit recovery is
arbitrary. But this dissent attempts to draw lines which comport more
closely with principles of intrinsic fairness than the line based on physical
damage."
Is a big, bright-line prohibitory rule, treating intangible economic
losses differently from other injuries, better tort policy than an approach
requiring the courts to confront the scope of liability issue for each
49. Id. at 1050.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1051.
52. The "vital inputs" criterion is not directed at the importance or legitimacy of
plaintiff's business, but rather at the closeness of the connection between plaintiff's business
and the use of the river. Judge Wisdom used the "particular damage" concept to the
same effect:
In a maritime accident, a business suffers "particular" damages to the extent
that the accident prevents the business from engaging in primary maritime
activities, such as fishing or use of the waterways, or supplying commodities
or services vital to primary maritime activities, such as those of bait and tackle
shops, drydocks, marinas, and seafood wholesalers or processors. All other
losses that are not peculiar to maritime activities are part of the general economic
dislocation caused by the accident and are therefore not "particular."




type of plaintiff and each item of claimed damages? Leon Green would
not have found much difficulty with the question:5 4
[Rlules of law tend to become less and less dependable, and
more and more fluid as society becomes more complex and
people more intelligent." The formula can not be invented which
relieves the judges and juries from the painful necessity of using
their good sense in deciding cases.56 Intelligence and formulas
soon part company.7 Rules will carry those who must pass
judgment only so far, figuratively speaking, into the neighbor-
hood of the problem to be passed upon, and then the judges
must get off and walk. 8
B. People Express v. Consolidated Rail
The other indispensable recent opinion is People Express Airlines
v. Consolidated Rail.5 9 The defendants' negligence caused a dangerous
gas to escape from a railroad car. Fearing explosion, defendants and
the local authorities worked out an evacuation plan covering the area
within a one-mile radius. Included was plaintiff-airline's Newark ter-
minal. Plaintiff suffered a twelve-hour business shutdown, and sued in
tort for its losses. The trial court applied the prohibitory rule, granting
summary judgment for defendant.
The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed. The court first explained
its dissatisfaction with the prohibitory rule. (1) It is a general product
of the courts' "fear of fraudulent claims, mass litigation, and limitless
liability." 6° But those same concerns are present in physical injury cases,
and courts have managed to cope by applying general scope of liability
principles. (2) Denying all recovery for intangible economic loss is out
of step with the rest of tort law, including especially the recent trend
toward permitting recovery for emotional distress arising from physical
harm to another. "The answer to the allegation of unchecked liability
is not the judicial obstruction of a fairly grounded claim for redress.
Rather, it must be a more sedulous application of traditional concepts
of duty and proximate cause to the facts of each case."161 (3) The
prohibitory rule is often unjust. The physical harm requirement capri-
54. See generally Robertson, The Legal Philosophy of Leon Green, 56 Tex. L. Rev.
393 (1978).
55. Green, Book Review, 38 Yale L.J. 402, 403 (1929).
56. L. Green, Judge and Jury 264 (1930).
57. L. Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause 121 (1927).
58. L. Green, supra note 56, at 214.
59. 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985).
60. Id. at 252, 495 A.2d at 110.
61. Id. at 254, 495 A.2d at Ill.
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ciously showers compensation along the path of physical destruction,
regardless of the status or circumstances of individual claimants. Purely
economic losses are borne by innocent victims, who may not be able
to absorb their losses. . . . In the end, the challenge is to.fashion a
rule that limits liability but permits adjudication of meritorious claims. 6
(4) The prohibitory rule ill serves the objectives of tort law; it diminishes
the incentives for safety and fails to shift the loss of dangerous activities
to those best able to bear them.
Turning to the numerous exceptions to the prohibitory rule, the
People Express court discerned two common threads.
The first is that the element of foreseeability emerges as a more
appropriate analytical standard to determine the question of
liability than a per se prohibitory rule. The second is that the
extent to which the defendant knew or should have known the
particular consequences of his negligence, including the economic
loss of a particularly foreseeable plaintiff, is dispositive of the
issues of duty and fault. 63
The resultant approach was very similar to the Testbank dissent. The
People Express court distilled it into a requirement of "particular fore-
seeability," articulated as follows:
We hold . . . that a defendant owes a duty of care to take
reasonable measures to avoid the risk of causing economic dam-
ages, aside from physical injury, to particular plaintiffs or plain-
tiffs comprising an identifiable class with respect to whom
defendant knows or has reason to know are likely to suffer
such damages from its conduct .... An identifiable class of
plaintiffs must be particularly foreseeable in terms of the type
of persons or entities comprising the class, the certainty or
predictability of their presence, the approximate numbers of
those in the class, as well as the type of economic expectations
disrupted.64
Applying that approach to the facts before it, the court held that plaintiff
should recover.
Among the facts that persuade us that a cause of action has
been established is the close proximity of [plaintiff's terminal]
to [defendant's) freight yard; the obvious nature of the plaintiff's
operations and particular foreseeability of economic losses re-
sulting from an accident and evacuation; the defendants' actual
62. Id., 495 A.2d at Il1.
63. Id. at 256, 495 A.2d at 112.
64. Id. at 263, 495 A.2d at 116.
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or constructive knowledge of the volatile properties of ethylene
oxide; and the existence of an emergency response plan prepared
by some of the defendants . . . , which apparently called for the
nearby area to be evacuated .... We do not mean to suggest
... that actual knowledge of the eventual economic losses is
necessary . . . ; rather particular foreseeability will suffice. 65
The "particular foreseeability"66 approach appears to be gaining
favor as a way of bringing the treatment of intangible economic loss
into the negligence-law mainstream. The People Express court derived
the approach, in major part, from the law of negligent misrepresenta-
tion,67 which has been the most significant exception to the prohibitory
rule.6s This approach is virtually identical to the proposal in the Prosser
and Keeton treatise that "limitation to specifically foreseeable plaintiffs
. . . may suggest an ultimate solution to the problem, ' 69 and it is
consistent with the approach that is emerging in the British cases .7 1 It
is much more discriminating and fairness-oriented than the prohibitory
rule, and it does not demonstrably offend any of the law's policies.
One may hope that People Express and the Testbank dissent represent
the wave of the future.
C. The "Floodgates Factors" and the Different Types of Intangible
Economic Loss Cases
Negligently inflicted intangible economic loss is often thought of as
a single, big problem 7 ' but clarity of analysis might be furthered by
treating it as three or four small problems, i.e., by breaking the problem
down into subcategories or case types.7 2 Subcategorization seems appro-
65. Id. at 267-68, 495 A.2d at 118.
66. The corresponding Louisiana term might be "particular ease of association." See
Crowe, The Anatomy of a Tort-Greenian, As Interpreted by Crowe Who Has Been
Influenced by Malone-A Primer, 22 Loyola L. Rev. 903, 907 (1976).
67. 100 N.J. at 257-58, 495 A.2d at 112-13.
68. See supra text and note 25.
69. Prosser, supra note 6, §129 at 1001.
70. See Dias & Markesinis, supra note 26, at 20-22, 42-51.
71. See, e.g., Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, II J. Leg.
Stud. 281, 282 n.3 (1982); Perlman, supra note 2, at 71-72 & n.64.
72. Several commentators subdivide the area into (1) cases in which plaintiff suffers
economic loss because of physical injury to the person or property of another, and (2)
cases in which plaintiff's economic loss stems from defendant's negligence in the per-
formance of a contractual or professional undertaking with another to supply information,
etc. See James, supra note 33, at 43; Atiyah, Negligence and Economic Loss, 83 L.Q.
Rev. 248, 256 (1967); Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A
Reassessment, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1513, 1527-28 (1985). Cf. Probert, Negligence and Economic
Damage: The California-Florida Nexus, 33 U. Fla. L. Rev. 485, 485-86 & n. 4 (1981);
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priate; the factors influencing the courts' reactions to the propriety of
allowing recovery for intangible economic loss seem to cluster in different
ways in different types of cases.
A complete list of the factors that trouble courts grappling with
extent-of-liability problems would exhaust all of tort law.73 However, at
least the following "floodgates factors" 74 seem dramatically influential
in the intangible economic loss cases:
(1) the existence and nature of any relationship between plain-
tiff and defendant that existed before the damage was sus-
tained;
(2) the degree to which plaintiff may be seen to have been
entitled to rely on defendant's exercising reasonable care;
(3) whether there is another entity from whom plaintiff might
more reasonably seek redress;
(4) whether, even if plaintiff's action is denied, the aims of
deterrence will still be served because someone other than
plaintiff is in position to sue defendant for the negligent
conduct;
(5) the extent to which redressing plaintiff's injuries might ex-
pose this defendant and future defendants to unknown or
potentially very extensive liability;
(6) the extent to which redressing plaintiff's injuries might loose
a flood of litigation;
Wilkinson & Forte, "Pure Economic Loss-A Scottish Perspective, 1985 Jurid. Rev. I,
8-9 (1985). The Torts (Second) Restatement, supra note 6, gives no overview of the
intangible economic loss problem, but scatters its treatment through the sections on
"negligent interference with contract or prospective contractual relation" (§ 766C), and
"public nuisance" (§§ 821B, 821C). See especially § 766C comment (e) and § 821C
comment (h).
73. A similar but less extensive list of policy factors bearing on the wisdom of
extending or constricting the scope of negligence liability appeared in the following land-
mark California decisions: J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60 (1979)
(recognizing liability for economic loss resulting from defendant's negligent performance
of a contractual undertaking between defendant and plaintiff's lessor); Tarasoff v. Regents
of Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d 325, 551 P.2d 334 (1976) (holding psychiatrist to an
affirmative duty to warn the intended victims of defendant's potentially violent patient);
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561 (1968) (rejecting the traditional
categories of premises-defect victims and holding land occupier to a duty of reasonable
care under the circumstances to all such victims); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647,
320 P.2d 16 (1958) (recognizing a cause of action by disappointed legatee against notary
public whose negligence rendered the will ineffective).
74. The term "floodgates factors" is chosen for convenience of reference; it is not




(7) whether granting recovery to plaintiff could encourage col-
lusive or fraudulent claims;
.(8) the relative difficulty to plaintiff and defendant of avoiding
or insuring against the type of loss suffered by plaintiff.
Assuming that the summarized "floodgates factors" reasonably in-
dicate the range of judicial concerns called forth by the problem of
intangible economic loss, the situations that have given rise to frequent
litigation seem to fall into four categories:"
(A). Defendant's negligent conduct causes physical injury to the
person or property of another; plaintiff loses an economic benefit
he expected to derive from the other's person or property.
(B) Defendant's negligent conduct causes physical injury to the
person or property of another; plaintiff repairs that damage and
seeks reimbursement.
(C) Defendant's negligence in the performance of an under-
taking with another76 causes economic loss to plaintiff.
(D) Defendant's negligent impairment of the environment or
other public resource causes economic loss to plaintiff.
75. The categories in the text are intended to cover the recurrent types of cases, and
are not necessarily exhaustive. See also infra note 101. One situation that does not seem
to fit the scheme in the text involves defendant's negligence depriving plaintiff of the
expectation of being compensated (by someone other than defendant) for physical harm
suffered by plaintiff. See Williams v. State, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 644 P.2d 137 (1983) (traffic
policeman's negligent failure to identify tortfeasor cost plaintiff her traffic negligence
action; cause of action against policeman recognized); Wilkinson v. Coverdale, (1973)
(K.B.), I Esp. 74, [1975-18021 All. E.R. Rep. 339 (recognizing cause of action for
defendant's negligence in failing to renew plaintiff's fire insurance policy). Rabin, supra
note 72, at 1514-16, 1538, points out that such cases sometimes award recovery without
noting any "economic loss" issue, and cites that omission as evidence supporting his
thesis that the "economic loss" issue troubles judges principally when they perceive that
liability will be greatly disproportionate to defendant's degree of blameworthiness. (For
a similar suggestion, see James, supra note 72, at 48-51.) A simpler explanation of cases
like Williams is that the harm caused by defendant-loss of a cause of action for physical
injury-is so intimately involved with physical injury that the economic loss argument is
simply overlooked. (Compare the cases in which Tortfeasor A, cast in judgment to a
physically injured victim, seeks indemnity from Tortfeasor B. Sometimes these decisions
characterize A's action as seeking recovery for economic loss. See, e.g., General Motors
Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 860 (Tex. 1977). But more often they do not. See,
e.g., Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976, writ ref., n.r.e.).
One might say that the "normal" way to think about these problems is as physical harm
problems.)
76. When the undertaking was with the plaintiff, settled principles of misrepresentation
law will generally permit recovery in the relatively few instances in which contract theory
does not. See Restatement, supra note 6, § 766C comment (e).
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The foregoing breakdown seems to help in analyzing the general
Anglo-American economic loss jurisprudence. 7 Whether or not that turns
out to be true, it is at least a workable approach to the relevant Louisiana
jurisprudence.
IV. INTANGIBLE ECONOMIC Loss CAUSED BY DEFENDANT'S
NEGLIGENCE: THE LOUISIANA VIEW
In large outline, the course of the Louisiana jurisprudence treating
negligently-inflicted intangible economic loss closely resembles other Lou-
isiana tort stories. With respect to a surprising number of tort issues,
the history seems to have been: (1) scattered early decisions recognizing
the cause of action and noting no particular problem with it; (2) the
gradual or sudden emergence of negative judicial attitudes, often bor-
rowed from the common law; (3) the crystallization of those attitudes
into a "black-letter" prohibitory rule; (4) modern reexamination and
alteration of the prohibitory rule.79
After early Louisiana decisions had allowed recovery for negligently
caused intangible emotional loss, 79 a "black-letter" prohibitory rule grew
from the decision in Forcum-James Co. v. Duke Transportation Co."()
Recent decisions have undermined the Forcum-James rule. Tracing the
relevant developments is assisted by subdividing the jurisprudence into
the categories of cases suggested above.
77. In the leading common law cases of the first type, recovery was almost uniformly
disallowed. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S. Ct. 134
(1927); Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., L.R. 10 Q.B. 453 (C.A. 1875); Spartan Steel
& Alloys, Ltd. v. Martin & Co., [1973] I Q.B. 27; Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73
N.E.2d 200 (Ohio App. 1946); Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903). 1 have not
researched the second type of case at common law. In the leading cases of the third type
at common law, plaintiffs have frequently prevailed. See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598
P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979); Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958); Junior Books v. Veitchi
Co., 119831 A.C. 520; Hedley, Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, [19641 A.C. 465;
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). But see Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). The leading cases of the fourth type include
Testbank (except for fishermen, recovery denied); People Express (recovery allowed); and
Weller & Co. v. Foot & Mouth Disease Research Inst., [19661 1 Q.B. 569 (recovery
denied).
78. This has been the story respecting the intentional tort of interference with contract,
see supra text and notes 10-22. It was also the story with comparative negligence. See
Malone, Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 La. L. Rev. 125
(1945). According to Alston Johnson's December 6, 1985 presentation to the Louisiana
Judicial College, the same stages occurred respecting punitive damages. And one suspects
careful research would reveal a very similar progression on the problem of emotional
distress.
79. See Pharr v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S.S. Co., 115 La. 138, 38 So. 943 (1905).
80. 231 La. 953, 93 So. 2d 229 (1957).
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A. Defendant's Negligent Infliction of Physical Harm to the Person
or Property of Another Damaged Plaintiff's Economic Expectations:
The "Cable Cases"
Probably the most frequent type of intangible economic loss case
at common law and in Louisiana has been the situation in which
defendant's negligence damages the property of another and plaintiff
loses expected benefits from use of that property. These are sometimes
called the "cable cases,''" because a recurrent fact pattern has defendant
negligently cutting off plaintiff's power supply.12 (In another recurrent
fact pattern, defendant negligently injures plaintiff's employee or some
other person with whom plaintiff has contracted for services.83 )
Until very recently, the Louisiana answer in these cases was a quick
"no." Many of these decisions merely invoked the prohibitory rule,
without much explanation.8 4 But some explained. In Desormeaux v.
Central Industries, Inc.," plaintiff's father had agreed to supply water
for plaintiff's crops via an irrigation system owned by the father. Defend-
ant negligently damaged the system, interrupting the supply. The court
of appeal's opinion invoked the prohibitory rule, but also offered an
explanation evoking "floodgates factors" (3) and (4): "[Plaintiff] could
have sued his father who had contracted to supply him with irrigation
water. The father in turn could have sued the tort-feasor .... 186
The supreme court's recent decision in PPG Industries, Inc. v. Bean
Dredging 7 probably signals a major change in the law. Defendant neg-
ligently cut a Texaco pipeline, interrupting plaintiff's fuel supply. The
lower courts used the prohibitory rule to dismiss plaintiff's petition,
citing Forcum-James. The supreme court disapproved the Forcum-James
rule, stating that the flat prohibition should yield to careful case-by-
case application of the duty-risk analysis. The PPG approach is thus
generally the same as that applied by the People Express court and
urged by the Testbank dissent. But the PPG court failed to follow its
own approach. Affirming the denial of recovery, the majority stated
81. Dias & Markesinis, supra note 26, at 20.
82. See PPG, 447 So. 2d at 1058; Desormeaux v. Central Industries, Inc., 333 So.
2d 431 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 So. 2d 225 (La. 1976).
83. See Baughman Surgical Assoc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 302 So. 2d 316 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1974); Messina v. Sheraton Corp., 291 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974).
84. See Baughman & Messina, supra note 83.
85. 333 So. 2d 431 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 So. 2d 225 (La.1976) (Justices
Summers and Tate, dissenting from writ refusal).
86. 333 So. 2d at 435. Justice Tate's dissent from the refusal of writs called for
reexamination of the Forcum-James rule. 337 So. 2d at 225.
87. 447 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1984).
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that allowing recovery to plaintiff could open the litigation floodgates, 8
and that plaintiff's injury was not easily associated with the purposes
of the rule violated by defendant. Justice Calogero's dissent applauded
the demise of the prohibitory rule, but argued that plaintiff's was about
as meritorious an economic loss case as could ever arise: Defendant was
dredging right alongside plaintiff's plant, the pipeline was plainly marked
by signs and charts, and it obviously ran straight to plaintiff's plant.
The concluding subsection of this article discusses PPG and the
subsequent cases from a more general perspective. 9 For the present,
note that the prohibitory rule is formally dead, and that the approved
approach is a case-by-case determination of the merits and policy jus-
tifications for recognizing particular claims. PPG was a "cable case,"
but its effects should not be confined to that category. The opinion
itself is not confined to cable cases, but addresses the intangible economic
loss problem at large. Further, Louisiana courts have been somewhat
more reluctant to award recovery in the cable cases than in the categories
discussed below. Therefore, it seems clear that the rejection of the
prohibitory rule in PPG is applicable throughout the intangible economic
harms area.
B. Defendant Negligently Damaged the Person or Property of
Another, Plaintiff Repaired It and Seeks Reimbursement: The
"Indemnity Cases"
When defendant negligently causes personal injury or property dam-
age to A, sometimes B pays for or repairs the damage and sues defendant
for reimbursement. If B was clearly obligated to repair the damage,
usually subrogation theories will afford a basis for recovery.' If B was
not so obligated, or might not have been, subrogation theories are less
promising. Still, B has done something the law should approve and
encourage. 9' Furthermore, there is no significant "floodgate" problem
88. "[Ilmposition of responsibility on the tortfeasor for such damages could create
liability 'in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."'
447 So. 2d at 1061 (quoting Ultramares).
89. See infra text and notes 118-22.
90. Loss insurers are often subrogated to the insured's claims against the tortfeasor.
See Audubon Ins. Co. v. Ford, 453 So. 2d 232 (La. 1984); Sentry Indem. Co. v. Rester,
430 So. 2d 1159 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Johnson, Legal Subrogation of Insurer to
Insured's Rights Upon Payment of Claim, 39 La. L. Rev. 675 (1979). An employer or
insurance carrier who pays workers' compensation or maintenance and cure benefits to
an injured employee is entitled, via subrogation or something like it, to recovery against
the tortfeasor. See Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 409 F.2d 278, 284-85 (5th Cir. 1975);
Roberts v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 198 So. 2d 685 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
91. See A.V. Smith Const. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 422 So. 2d 697 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1982), appeal after remand, 450 So. 2d 39 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984), in which
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in such cases. The damages B seeks are known, finite, and limited; only
one B can repair such damage and seek reimbursement; and the courts
can easily insure that defendant is not made to pay twice for the same
harm.92 There really should be a basis for B's recovery, and the courts
have generally found one. While the great majority of the Louisiana
cases of this type have found a basis for awarding recovery, the courts
have looked to doctrinal sources other than negligence law. When sub-
rogation theories did not work,93 the courts used principles of unjust
enrichment, quasi contract, and/or negotiorum gestio.94 The courts have
been creative in finding ways to make the plaintiff whole.
However, in cases in which none of those theories worked (or was
pleaded or argued) and plaintiff proceeded solely on the 'basis of neg-
ligence, the rule was to deny recovery. 9 Forcum-James was one of these
cases.96 They were genuinely unfortunate decisions. Results should not
be made to turn on whether plaintiff's counsel had the wit to plead
unjust enrichment or negotiorum gestio. Given the liberality with which
those doctrines have been used in the "indemnity" cases, the few denials
of recovery appear as pleading traps for the unwary. If the PPG decision
accomplishes nothing else, certainly it should remove any basis for denial
of tort recovery in these cases.
B, doing work for a school board, repaired fire damage caused to school buildings by
defendant, and achieved reimbursement on the basis of quasi-contract and/or negotiorum
gestio. See also Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d
435 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957), in which B was an auto repairer, road testing a customer's
car when defendant negligently damaged it. B repaired the damage, and achieved reim-
bursement from defendant on the basis of negotiorum gestio principles. But see Hebert
v. Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. Co., 433 So. 2d 807 (La. App. Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 441
So. 2d 771 (La. 1983). In Hebert, the car damaged by defendant's negligence was leased
for B's use by his employer. B repaired the damage and was denied reimbursement on
the basis of Forcum-James.
92. See Audubon Ins. Co. v. Ford, 453 So. 2d 232 (La. 1984) (defendant settled
with its victim without notice of a loss insurer's subrogation claim, and was held protected
by the settlement).
93. See supra text and note 90.
94. The decisions have not clearly distinguished between these theories. For instances
in which one or more of them justified recovery, see Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc.,
251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (1967); A.V. Smith Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 422
So. 2d 697 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), appeal after remand, 450 So. 2d 39 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1984); Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 435
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
95. See, e.g., Hebert v. Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. Co., 433 So. 2d 807 (La. App.
1st Cir.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 771 (La. 1983); Transport Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor
Co., 259 So. 2d 606 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
96. In Forcum-James, defendant's negligence damaged the state's bridge, which plain-
tiff was contractually obliged to repair. Plaintiff's tort action was rejected by the court,
but the case was remanded to give plaintiff a chance to plead a valid basis for subrogation.
[Vol. 46
INTANGIBLE ECONOMIC LOSS
Disappointingly, PPG is not yet having the desired effect.97 Illinois
Central Gulf Railroad Co. v. Texaco, Inc.98 was a post-PPG case in
which plaintiff, a rail carrier, mistakenly left a tank car containing
chemicals owned by Air Products at defendant's yard. Defendant un-
loaded and used the chemicals. After paying Air Products for the loss,
plaintiff sought reimbursement from defendant. Relying on Forcum-
James and on the result in PPG, the court of appeal held that plaintiff
had no cause of action in negligence, but remanded the case to permit
plaintiff to plead other theories, such as "implied indemnity, depositary
and LSA-C.C. Art. 2134."" Judge Boutall, concurring, urged that For-
cum-James should be rejected or narrowly limited, and argued that in
any event plaintiff's federal-law obligation to pay Air Products for the
loss meant that plaintiff had a valid basis for recovery based on legal
subrogation.
The supreme court declined to review Illinois Central, and no justice
registered a dissent.'00 If the supreme court intends for intangible eco-
nomic loss cases to be analyzed under the sensitive duty-risk approach
it commended in PPG, it needs to review cases like Illinois Central.
Until that happens, the PPG approach will remain inchoate. Meanwhile,
most of the "indemnity" cases will probably continue to result in
recovery for plaintiff, but it will continue to be necessary for plaintiff's
counsel to structure the case so that it can be made to fit into one of
the accepted pigeonholes.
C. Defendant's Negligence in Performing an Undertaking With a
Third Person Causes Economic Loss to Plaintiff: The "Undertaking
Cases"' 0
Louisiana plaintiffs have generally recovered in cases in which the
defendant's negligent performance of an undertaking with another caused
97. In general, PPG has been misconstrued in the jurisprudence. See infra text and
notes 118-22.
98. 467 So. 2d 1141 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 So. 2d 27 (La. 1985).
99. 467 So. 2d at 1143. "Implied indemnity" is an unjust enrichment and/or quasi-
contract theory. See Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422
(1967). "Depositary" and La. Civ. Code art. 2134 are negotiorum gestio principles. See
A.V. Smith Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 422 So. 2d 697 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982),
appeal after remand, 450 So. 2d 39 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984); Standard Motor Car Co.
v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 435 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
100. 372 So. 2d 27 (La. 1985).
101. Analytically, many strict products liability and redhibition cases fall into this
category. In the view of many analysts, recovery by a "remote" (non-privity) plaintiff
for damage to or loss of use of the defective product itself amounts to economic loss
recovery. See generally, Robertson, Manufacturers' Liability For Defective Products in
Louisiana Law, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 50, 74-113 (1975). These decisions are not directly
considered in the present article.
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foreseeable economic harm. Quite often, plaintiff has been held sub-
rogated to the contractual rights of the other against defendant., °2 In
other cases, plaintiff was held to be a third-party beneficiary of defend-
ant's contract with the other. 0° In addition, there is a strong line of
authority awarding recovery on a straightforward negligence basis.
Several of these negligence decisions contain useful discussion of
many of the factors that trouble courts in intangible economic loss cases.
The leading decision is Calandro Development, Inc. v. R.M. Butler
Contractors, Inc."° The owner of a construction project hired defendant,
an engineer, to design and supervise the project. Later the owner hired
a contractor to do some of the work. Plaintiff was the surety on the
contractor's performance bond. When the contractor was unable to
perform the work and defaulted, plaintiff paid off on the bond, and
then sued defendant-engineer, contending that negligence in the design
of the project caused the contractor's default and thus, plaintiff's loss.
After discussing the leading common law decisions dealing with this type
of economic loss problem,'0 the court held that there was no meaningful
barrier to recognizing a negligence cause of action, reasoning that: (1)
Defendant must be deemed to know that his services are for the pro-
tection of the contractor and the contractor's surety as well as the owner
of the project. (2) Liability would not be extensive or indeterminate-
it runs to a known party, for an amount certain. (3) The relationship
between defendant-engineer and plaintiff, while not contractual, is very
close, amounting to near-privity. The Calandro opinion thus invoked
"floodgates factors" (1), (2), (5), and (6) in support of its recognition
of the propriety of recovery.
Significantly, the Calandro court further held that the duty of care
owed plaintiff by defendant was the same care defendant owed to the
owner under the contract."°6 (The result in Calandro favored defendant,
on the ground that no breach of duty was proved.)
102. See Aizpurua v. Crane Pool Co., 449 So. 2d 471 (La. 1984), in which plaintiff
bought a home with a bad swimming pool, and sued the contractor who had built it for
a former owner. The court held that any tort or redhibition rights of plaintiff were
prescribed, but that plaintiff was subrogated to the former owner's warranty claims against
the pool contractor. See also Smith v. Ly, 470 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985)
(similar facts, reasoning, and outcome to Aizpurua).
103. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Marine Concrete Structures, 464 So. 2d 829 (La. App.
5th Cir.), cert. denied, 468 So. 2d 1208 (La. 1985).
104. 249 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
105. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 170, 174 N.E. at 441; Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 236, 135
N.E. at 275.
106. 249 So. 2d at 265. Limiting the degree of care owed by defendant by the terms
of defendant's undertaking with the "other" is widely regarded as sound policy. See,
e.g., Hedley-Byrne, 11964] A.C. at 465; Dias & Markesinis, supra note 26, at 44-45. The
Louisiana opinions appear to agree. In Addition to Calandro, see Herlitz Corp. v.
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Similar cases subsequent to Calandro have generally cited it and
followed its approach. 0 7 Alley v. Courtneya presented a slightly different
version of the problem.1 9 Defendant was a professional construction
appraiser. Such appraisers are typically hired by builders to appraise
and make periodic inspections of construction projects; the builders rely
on these reports to get working capital. In Alley, a bank loaned money
to a builder on the strength of a negligent appraisal by defendant.
Plaintiff was a guarantor of the bank loan, and eventually had to pay.
The court held that plaintiff had a negligence action against defendant,
stating:
As a professional appraiser and inspector, defendant knew or
should have known that each of his reports would be relied on
to the detriment of a lender if the report was erroneous. Under
such circumstances, defendant's duty was not owed solely to the
builder, but extended to plaintiff and others that might suffer
reasonably foreseeable and direct injury .... 1o
Thus, the Alley opinion relied on "floodgates. factors" (2), (5), and (6)
in support of recognizing the cause of action.
It is significant that the negligence cases of the type under discussion
do not treat Forcum-James or PPG as relevant. Apparently the "un-
dertaking" cases are perceived as a discrete category. The perception
seems sound. The Calandro and Alley opinions explain why the "flood-
gates" factors are not particularly troublesome. PPG should make re-
covery in such cases somewhat easier to achieve, but in the undertaking
cases, the courts were following PPG's suggested approach long before
PPG was decided.
Matherne, 476 So. 2d 1037 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) (contributory negligence of assignor
imputed to assignee).
107. American Fid. Fire Ins. v. Pavia-Byrne Engineering, 393 So. 2d 830 (La. App.
2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 So. 2d 1362 (La. 1981), presented the same fact pattern as
Calandro. The court of appeal followed Calandro and held the engineer liable in tort to
the contractor's surety. Three supreme court justices-Dennis, Lemmon, and Marcus-
would have granted writs in Pavia-Byrne. For other cases following the Calandro approach
and approving recovery in similar situations, see R & R Enterprises v. Rivers & Gulf
Marine Survey, 476 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985) (no negligence found); Daniel
Oil v. Signal Rental Tools & Oilfield Serv., Inc., 461 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1984); Emond v. Tyler Bldg. & Constr. Co., 438 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982);
Gurtler, Hebert & Co. v. Weyland Mach. Shop., 405 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 410 So. 2d 1130 (La. 1982) (Justice Marcus dissenting from writ
refusal).
108. 448 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 450 So. 2d 360 (La. 1984).
109. For yet another variant, see Pinner v. Schmidt, 617 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1985)
(liability for negligent violation of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1681).
110. 448 So. 2d at 860.
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D. Defendant's Negligent Impairment of the Environment or a
Public Resource Causes Economic Loss to Plaintiff. The
"'Environment Cases"
At common law, the doctrine recognizing private actions for public
nuisance is sometimes adduced as a settled exception to the prohibitory
rule. ' When defendant has caused a public nuisance, such as blocking
a highway or a river, that doctrine permits recovery on a showing that
plaintiff has suffered "particular damages," i.e., damages different in
kind and degree from those suffered by the general public. Physical
harm to plaintiff's person or tangible property would certainly qualify
as "particular damages," but the courts have not always required phys-
ical harm in these cases. Judge Widsom's Testbank dissent used the
"particular damages" concept as an important ingredient of the liability-
limiting approach there advocated." 2
Public nuisance concepts have largely been ignored in Louisiana."3
Evidently only two reported decisions address the propriety of recovery
of intangible economic losses produced by defendant's negligent im-
pairment of a public resource. Neither mentions public nuisance ideas.
Pharr v. Morgan's L. & T.R. & S.S. Co." 4 was an early supreme court
decision approving recovery on behalf of a frequent business user of
the Atchafalaya River who had to hire an additional steamboat because
defendant had negligently blocked most of the navigable channel. The
court gave no indication that it perceived any special problem with the
recovery of intangible economic losses. ' 5 Peltier v. Department of
High ways ' 6 was a recent court of appeal decision presenting a virtually
identical problem, except that defendant was the state rather than a
private entity. The Peltier opinion distinguished Pharr on the public/
private basis and denied recovery, expressing a policy preference for
leaving such injuries to rest on private businesses rather than shifting
the loss to the state and hence the taxpayers." 7 Presumably Peltier would
I1. See, e.g., People Express, 100 N.J. at 259-60, 495 A.2d at 113-14. See generally
Restatement, supra note, 6 § 821C comment (h).
112. 752 F.2d at 1046-47, 1049.
113. There is some authority suggesting that any interested citizen may sue to force
removal of an obstruction to a public way. See Giardina v. Marrero Furniture Co., 310
So. 2d 607 (La. 1975).
114. 115 La. 138, 38 So. 943 (1905).
115. Pharr is completely inconsistent with Forcum-James. The progression from Pharr
to Forcum-James is another example of the "typical" history discussed supra at note 78.
Neither Forcum-James nor PPG refers to the Pharr decision.
116. 357 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 630 (1978) (Justice
Summers dissenting from writ refusal).
117. Peltier thus rests on an overt preference for the state litigant, of the sort that
the supreme court has repeatedly denounced as invalid on the basis of the 1974 consti-
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have been decided consistently with Pharr had the defendant been a
private entity.
The opinions in Pharr and Peltier give no indication that either
court perceived any special problem with recovery for intangible eco-
nomic losses. (Pharr was decided long before the prohibitory rule emerged
in Forcum-James, and Peltier does not mention the issue.) While one
might infer that the Louisiana courts perceive environmental or public
resource damage cases as a discrete economic loss category which gen-
erates no grave "floodgate" concerns, probably no meaningful gener-
alization is possible on the basis of just two decisions.
E. Summary and Conclusion
The Louisiana courts have used negligence law to award damages
for intangible economic losses in the undertaking cases (and in at least
one environmental case), but not in the "indemnity" and cable cases.
The denial of negligence recovery in the indemnity cases cannot be
explained by the floodgate factors; most of the cases just seem wrongly
reasoned, and are probably explained by the relative ease of justifying
recovery on the basis of subrogation, unjust enrichment, and the like.
The floodgate factors do help to explain the divergent treatment of the
cable cases; factors (3) through (6) seem to weigh especially heavily
against plaintiffs in cable cases. But not every cable case presents sig-
nificant floodgate problems. Rather than continuing to reflect the di-
vergent treatment of these cases, the Louisiana jurisprudence should
adopt the case-by-case approach espoused by the courts in PPG and
People Express and by the Testbank dissent. This seems a much more
discriminating and justice-oriented method of resolving these cases than
any set of categorical rules.
Unfortunately, the PPG decisionr has been misconstrued or ignored
in the subsequent Louisiana economic loss jurisprudence. As indicated
above, the PPG majority did not seem to follow its own approach.
This had led some of the courts of appeal to use PPG merely as
additional support for continuing to apply the prohibitory rule. In Babin
v. Texaco, Inc.," 8 defendant's negligent conduct necessitated the closure
of a salt mine, depriving plaintiffs, mine employees, of their livelihood.
The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment for defendant, pointing
to the PPG result and to language in the PPG opinion adducing loss
tutional provision (article 12, § 10) waiving the state's immunity in tort and contract.
See, e.g., Segura v. Louisiana Architects Selection Bd., 362 So. 2d 498 (La. 1978). See
also Hargrave, Statutory and Hortatory Provisions of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
43 La. L. Rev. 647, 653 (1983).
118. 449 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 So. 2d 165 (La. 1984)
(Justices Calogero and Lemon dissenting from writ refusal).
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of employment to PPG employees as an obvious part of the "indeter-
minate" liability that must necessarily be avoided. Two supreme court
justices would have granted writs in Babin." 9 In Illinois Central Gulf
Railroad Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,2 0 discussed above, 2' another court of
appeal used PPG to support denial of negligence recovery to a plaintiff
who, in good faith and probably pursuant to an obligation, repaired the
damage caused by defendant's negligence. No supreme court justice
dissented from the refusal of writs of review in Illinois Central.
Further, PPG seems to have had an unfortunate influence on some
members of the Louisiana Supreme Court. A settled rule of negligence
law holds that a plaintiff who has sustained physical injury to his tangible
property is entitled to recover both repair costs and other economic
losses directly produced by the damage to his property. But in the
supreme court's recent decision in Borden, Inc. v. Howard Trucking
Co., 2 three justices questioned the application of that settled rule,
relying in part on a quite paradoxical application of PPG. In Borden,
plaintiff hired a repair contractor to work on a piece of equipment,
and the contractor hired defendant to have the equipment transported
to the contractor's shop. Defendant's negligence damaged the equipment,
and plaintiff sought recovery for repair costs and loss of production
and profits during the delay at plaintiff's plant caused by the damage
to the equipment. The supreme court majority was concerned solely
with insurance issues-which of defendant's two liability insurers was
responsible for the repair costs, and which for the loss of production
and profits-and indicated no hesitancy as to the plaintiff's entitlement
to both types of damages. However, three justices dissented, urging that
recovery should be limited to the repair costs, with one justice relying
extensively on the PPG decision in support of that position.
Obviously the full effects of PPG remain to be worked out by the
courts. Several observations might be made about the developments to
date. On the issue of intangible economic loss, courts might arrive at
any one of several tenable positions: firm adherence to a prohibitory
rule; general adherence to a prohibitory rule, while recognizing certain
exceptions to it; or abandonment of the prohibitory rule in favor of a
case-by-case application of the scope of liability principles encompassed
by the duty-risk analysis. Unfortunately, a fourth position, not at all
tenable, is also possible: Announcing that the prohibitory rule has been
jettisoned in favor of duty-risk principles while continuing in fact to
hold to the prohibitory rule. This fourth position, while it lasts, is the
119. See supra note 118.
120. 467 So. 2d 1141 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 So.,2d 27 (La. 1985).
121. See supra notes 98-100.
122. 454 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1984).
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worst of all jurisprudential worlds. It invites litigation, while ultimately
guaranteeing its failure. It defeats clarity and disappoints legitimate
expectations. Unfortunately, the fourth position may be where PPG has
left us. The supreme court should probably have granted writs in one
or more of the post-PPG opinions in order to restore clarity to the
situation, either by reaffirming the prohibitory rule or, much to be
preferred, by demonstrating in the form of a holding in favor of liability
that it has in fact been renounced.

